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Abstract 
This study aims to investigate the extent of Malaysian directors’ remuneration disclosure in 
the annual reports. In addition, this research seeks to examine the relationship between 
corporate governance structure and the disclosure practices of directors’ remuneration. We 
measure the extent of directors’ remuneration disclosure by the following four measures – 
the disclosure of individual pay for each director, band of pay, linkage to performance, and 
components of pay.  Drawing on agency theory, we expect that the extent of directors’ 
remuneration disclosure is positively associated with the independence of boards of 
directors, audit committees and remuneration committees. In addition, we expect an inverse 
relationship between directors’ remuneration disclosure and ownership structure. The 
annual reports of 376 companies listed on Bursa Malaysia are randomly selected and 
analyzed. The results reveal that most of the sampled firms communicate information about 
the directors’ pay in bands of RM50,000, together with the narration of linkages between the 
directors’ pay and performance in their annual reports. Not many companies disclose 
information about individual directors’ pay, or separately disclose the salary and bonus 
components. In addition, the regression results suggest that the independent of board of 
director and remuneration committee are associated with disclosure of directors’ pay bands. 
Bigger firms are more likely to communicate individual director’s pay, and disclose salary 
and bonus components separately in their annual reports. The findings have important 
implication in understanding the disclosure practices of companies in relation to the 
directors’ remuneration.  
 
 
1.0 INTRODUCTION 
This study provides evidence on the disclosure practices of directors’ remuneration in the 
annual reports of Malaysian companies. It is argued that remuneration disclosure is an 
important mechanism to constrain company directors from using their positions to award 
themselves with excessive pay, and to reassure shareholders that the directors are not doing 
so (Australian Government Productivity Commission, 2009). The 2009 survey on corporate 
governance in Malaysia by the Minority Shareholder Watchdog Group (MSWG) suggests 
that the quality of directors’ remuneration disclosure in Malaysia is a cause for concern. The 
Press Release by the MSWG (2009) indicates that only 5.2% of listed companies in Malaysia 
disclose directors’ remuneration by individual directors. Thus, the disclosure of executive 
